Non-cooperative game theory including normal and extensive forms, repeated games, incomplete information, and mechanism design. Emphasis is placed on solutions that model rational competition, learning, or efficient bargaining. Economic applications include static Bertrand and Cournot competition, auctions, dynamic oligopoly, entry decisions, entry deterrence, and bargaining theory. Enrollment is limited to Econ PhD students for the first two weeks of open enrollment, after which the remaining space will be available to all other interested students.
3-5 units · Letter or Credit/No Credit
Non-cooperative game theory including normal and extensive forms, repeated games, incomplete information, and mechanism design. Emphasis is placed on solutions that model rational competition, learning, or efficient bargaining. Economic applications include static Bertrand and Cournot competition, auctions, dynamic oligopoly, entry decisions, entry deterrence, and bargaining theory. Enrollment is limited to Econ PhD students for the first two weeks of open enrollment, after which the remaining space will be available to all other interested students.
Offered in Winter 2027 at Stanford University.