Social Choice, including Arrow's theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The theory of contracts, emphasizing contractual incompleteness and the problem of moral hazard. Incentive regulation. Competition with imperfect information, including signaling and adverse selection. Competitive equilibrium and the core. Limited enrollment. Non-Econ students need permission of instructor to enroll. Enrollment is limited to Econ PhD students for the first two weeks of open enrollment, after which the remaining space will be available to all other interested students.
3-5 units · Letter or Credit/No Credit
Social Choice, including Arrow's theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The theory of contracts, emphasizing contractual incompleteness and the problem of moral hazard. Incentive regulation. Competition with imperfect information, including signaling and adverse selection. Competitive equilibrium and the core. Limited enrollment. Non-Econ students need permission of instructor to enroll. Enrollment is limited to Econ PhD students for the first two weeks of open enrollment, after which the remaining space will be available to all other interested students.
Offered in Spring 2027 at Stanford University.